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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1991)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1991)

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 900382-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

LEMUEL T. SMALL,

*

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine),
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute (marijuana), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); and
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1991).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling
that the roadblock stop of defendant's vehicle was proper and
that defendant consented to the subsequent search of the vehicle.
The factual findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they

are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the trial court's
legal conclusions based on its factual findings, the appellate
court applies a correction of error standard of review.
Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 610 (Utah App. 1991).

State v.

Accord United States

v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1484 (10th Cir. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lemuel Thomas Small, was charged in an
amended information with one count of possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), and two counts of
possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute
(methamphetamine and marijuana), as second and third degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ivj
(Supp. 1991) (Record [R.] 150-51).
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized incident to the roadblock stop of
defendant's vehicle,1 a jury convicted defendant as charged (R.
28; defendant's motion to suppress; R. 55-58, trial court's
ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress; R. 200-02, guilty
verdict).

The court sentenced defendant to a term of not less

1

Although defendant was tried jointly with a codefendant,
Dennis Shoulderblade, defendants elected to take separate
appeals. See State v. Shoulderblade, No. 900288-CA.
-2-

than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for
the second degree felony, and two terms not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison for the two third degree felonies, all
terms to run concurrently (R. 302).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out in the trial court's ruling,
which defendant does not challenge (R. 55-58).

Those findings of

fact are as follows:
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard
County Sheriff's Office conducted a roadblock
on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15,
south of Fillmore. Notice of the checkpoint
was duly given one week before in the local
newspaper of general circulation. Prior to
setting the roadblock, the officers were
briefed and instructed to check for proper
driver's license and vehicle registration.
Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the
checkpoint at some distance in front of the
block.
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped.
Pursuant to the roadblock, defendants were
stopped. During the stop, the officer
present observed defendant Small shove a
plastic bag between the front seats of the
car. The officer checked both defendants'
identification and determined that the car
was not registered to either defendant.
While awaiting confirmation from dispatch
regarding registration, the officer asked
defendants whether there were any firearms,
alcohol, or drugs in the car. The response
was in the negative. The officer then
requested permission to search the vehicle.
Consent was given.
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car,
the officer noticed a gun under the front
seat. [The] [subsequent search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed

-3-

a substantial quantity of drugs, drug
paraphernalia, money, and loaded firearms.
In the course of the search of the passenger
compartment, the officer asked defendants if
they knew anytning about the firearms or the
drugs. Defendants responded in the negative,
They were subsequently arrested and were
apprised of their rights before any further
attempt at questioning.
As the officer
compartment of
he believed to
subsequentlyf]
more drugs and

searched the passenger
the vehicle, he smelled what
be raw marijuana. Ke
opened the trunk and found
paraphernalia.

(R. at 55-56) (See Addendum A for a complete copy of the lower
court's ruling).2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State concedes that the Millard County roadblock,
established to check licenses and registration, as well as to
observe any other violations of the criminal law, fails to meet
the requirements for suspicionless roadblock stops under the
federal constitution.

The record before this Court fails to show

that the roadblock was carried our pursuant to an explicit
neutral plan, developed by politically accountable officials,
which limited the conduct of individual officers. Moreover,
there is no indication in the record that the authorization
process involved any balancing of fourth amendment interests, law
enforcement interests, or an assessment of the effectiveness of
2

Defendant's recitation of the facts on appeal appears
to contain cites to the transcript of a preliminary hearing
apparently held on October 11, 1988 which has not been made part
of the record before this Court.
-4-

the roadblock in meeting those interests.

Therefore, the

roadblock stop violated defendant's fourth amendment rights
against unreasonable seizure.
In spite of the initial illegality of the roadblock
stop of defendant's vehicle, the issue remains whether the
subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was nevertheless a
valid consent search.

Because the trial court ruled on the

validity of defendant's consent to search prior to the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Arroyo 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), this Court should remand the case to the trial court for
evaluation of defendant's consent under Arroyo and the entry of
appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions on the
voluntariness and exploitation prongs of Arroyo's two-prong test.
In remanding to the trial court, the Court first should
clarify what standard of proof applies to the determination of
whether there was voluntary consent to search.

The majority, and

better reasoned view, is that the state need only prove voluntary
consent by a preponderance of the evidence.

Second, the Court

should direct the trial court to apply the exploitation prong of
the Arroyo test in a manner different from that employed by the
panels in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991), and State v.
Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
1991).

P.2d

(Utah

The approach followed in Sims and Park is not consistent

with either Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), relied on by

-5-

the supreme court in Arroyo, or the remand that occurred in
Arroyo.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
FAILS TO PASS FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER.
Defendant asserts that the suspicionless roadblock at
which he was stopped violated his federal and state
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure
because the roadblock, which was established to check for proper
driver's licenses and registration, as well as to observe any
other violations of the criminal law, was not explicitly
authorized by statute, nor was it supported by a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

Moreover, defendant asserts

"[t]he State showed neither that the roadblock significantly
advanced the public interest in law enforcement nor that there
were less intrusive means available to advance that interest"
(Br. of App. at 6).

The State concedes that the roadblock in the

present case fails to meet the requirements for suspicionless
roadblock stops under the federal constitution.
At the time of its denial of defendant's motion to
suppress, the trial court ruled without benefit of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz,

U.S.

, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), which

discussed the validity of a Michigan state sobriety checkpoint
under the fourth amendment.

In addition, the trial court ruled

without benefit of this Court's subsequent interpretative
-6-

opinions in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 146 (Jtah App. 1991),
cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 1991); State v.
Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah App. 1991), and State v. Park,
810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert. denied,

P.2d

(Utah 1991),

where this Court held suspicioniess roadblocks identical to the
one at issue here invalid under the fourth amendment.3

Thus,

the State concedes that while the trial court's factual findings
underlying its ruling upholding the roadblock in this case are
not clearly erroneous, its resultant legal conclusion, drawn from
those facts, is not supportable under the aforementioned case
law.
As in Sims, Kitchen and Park, the record before this
Court fails to show that the roadblock was carried out pursuant
to an explicit neutral plan, developed by "politically
accountable officials," which limited the conduct of individual
officers,

Park, 810 P.2d at 458; Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47.

Cf.

Kitchen 808 P.2d at 1130 (noting that unlike the plan in Sitz,
the roadblock plan before the court was prepared by the actual
officer who conducted the roadblock, rather than by a neutral
body).

Moreover, there is no indication in the record "that the

authorization process involved any balancing of fourth amendment
interests, law enforcement interests, or an assessment of the
3

Sims also reached the state constitutional issue, holding
that the roadblock there was invalid under article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution as well. 808 P.2d at 147-50. Because
the State concedes the invalidity of the present roadblock under
the fourth amendment, this Court need not consider its validity
under the state constitution. Jld. at 152 (Orme, J., concurring
specially).
-7-

effectiveness of the roadblock in meeting those interests."
Park, 810 P.2d at 458; see also Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47 (noting
that officials authorizing a roadblock are responsible for
performing an initial balancing between the fourth amendment and
the interests served by the roadblock plan, which balancing is a
prerequisite to any judicial balancing analysis of a
suspicionless roadblock).

Therefore, the roadblock stop violated

defendant's fourth amendment rights against unreasonable seizure.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE
TRIAL COURT FOR A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS VALID UNDER
STATE V. ARROYO.
Despite the initial illegality of the roadblock stop of
defendant's vehicle, the issue remains whether the subsequent
warrantless search of the vehicle was nevertheless valid.
Relying on Sims, defendant asserts that his consent to search
"was obtained as a result of an unbroken chain of events that
began with the roadblock stop[;] . . . .

[cConsequently, the

consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the
initial illegal stop" (Br. of App. at 22-23).A

A

Defendant's non-attenuation argument is raised for the
first time on appeal before this Court (Br. of App. at 21).
However, a non-attenuation argument was arguably unavailable to
defendant in the trial court because, as acknowledged in Sims,
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary
illegality," id. at 150; Park, 808 P.2d at 458- Thus, the State
makes no argument concerning defendant's arguable waiver of the
issue and acknowledges that this Court considered similar nonattenuation arguments raised for the first time on appeal in both
Sims and Park.

In light of the State's concession regarding the
illegality of the roadblock under the fourth amendment, the State
recognizes its burden "to show that evidence obtained following
illegal police conduct is attenuated from the illegality."

Sims,

808 P.2d at 151 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604
(1975)).5

Under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990),

the inquiry whether a consent to search is lawfully obtained
following initial police misconduct must focus on two factors:
(1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) whether the
consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality.

Because the trial court ruled on the validity of

defendant's consent without benefit of the Arroyo analysis, this
Court should remand the case to the trial court for an evaluation
of defendant's consent to search under Arroyo and the entry of
appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions on the
voluntariness and exploitation prongs of Arroyo's two-prong test.
However, in remanding, this Court should provide direction to the
trial court on the proper application of Arroyo.
A. Voluntariness
As to the first prong of the Arroyo test, it is well
settled that to determine whether consent to search is voluntary,
5

As noted previously, defendant was tried jointly with a
codefendant, Dennis Shoulderblade; however, defendants elected to
take separate appeals. With the exception of its discussion of
Shoulderblade's failure to attack the trial court's finding of
consent to search his vehicle on appeal to this Court, the
State's analysis of the consent issue raised in this case is
identical to its analysis of the issue in State v. Shoulderblade,
Case No. 900288-CA. The State's brief in Shoulderblade was filed
on November 5, 1991.
-9-

a totality of circumstances test applies to ascertain whether the
consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the result of
"duress or coercion, express or implied."
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).

Schneckloth v.
See also State v.

Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1990).

And, the issue of voluntary consent is a

question of fact on which the state carries the burden of proof.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).

But see State v. Bobo,

803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court's ultimate
determination of voluntary consent is a conclusion of law).
However, this Court has not made clear what standard of proof
applies to this factual inquiry.

See State v. Carter, 812 P.2d

460, 467 n.7 (Utah App.) (declining to decide whether the
applicable standard of proof is the clear and convincing standard
or the preponderance of evidence standard), cert, pending, 167
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah July 26, 1991).

There is no good reason

not to resolve this question and provide the trial courts with
needed direction.
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, and State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82, this Court appeared to adopt a clear and
convincing standard of proof by embracing the standard espoused
in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976).
Quoting Abbott, the Marshall Court set out the following standard
which must be met by the state "to sustain its burden to show
that voluntary consent was given":
-10-

(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given"; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived.
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962))).
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as
being an unduly strict standard of proof.

United States v.

Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440
U.S. 958 (1979).

Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes

a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the
evidence.

See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177

n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado,
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez. 906 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States,
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 199 Ill.App.3d
1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277 (111. App. 1990); State v. Cress, 576 A.2d
-11-

1366 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990);
People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632f 270 Cal.Rptr. 248
(1990) .
While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this
context is not universal, see 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure,
S 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the
majority view.

As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said in

overruling its prior decisions that adopted a clear and
convincing standard of proof:
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated
that the preponderance of evidence standard
supplies the burden which the government must
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence when the motion concerns
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v.
Twomev, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619,
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
In conformity with the rationale
announced by the Supreme Court, we overrule
our previous decisions requiring the
government at a suppression hearing to prove
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear
and convincing evidence. "[T]he controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14,
94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974).

-12-

United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d at 76.

In Lego v. Twomev, the

Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance
standard:
Since the purpose that a voluntariness
hearing is designed to serve has nothing
whatever to do with improving the reliability
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge
that judging the admissibility of a
confession by a preponderance of the evidence
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not
concerned with the standards for determining
the admissibility of evidence or with the
prosecution's burden of proof at a
suppression hearing when evidence is
challenged on constitutional grounds.
Winship went no further than to confirm the
fundamental right that protects "the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is
charged." JEd. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . .
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less
reliable or less consonant with Winship
simply because the admissibility of a
confession is determined by a less stringent
standard. . . .
404 U.S. at 486-87.

The Court also rejected the argument that

the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are
designed to protect:
The argument is straightforward and has
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely
emphasizing the importance of the values
served by exclusionary rules is itself
sufficient demonstration that the
Constitution also requires admissibility to
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been excluded from federal
criminal trials for years. The same is true
-13-

of coerced confessions offered in federal or
state trials. But, from our experience over
this period of time no substantial evidence
has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without
good cause, we are unwilling to expand
currently applicable exclusionary rules by
erecting additional barriers to placing
truthful and probative evidence before state
juries . . . .
Sound reason for moving
further in this direction has not been
offered here nor do we discern any at the
present time. This is particularly true
since the exclusionary rules are very much
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the
police and prosecution and it is very
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment
suppression hearings would be sufficiently
productive in this respect to outweigh the
public interest in placing probative evidence
before juries for the purpose of arriving at
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted).

Although

the Court said that "the States are free pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [tjhey may indeed
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find
at stake," id., at 489, the reasoning of Lego v. Twomev is sound
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a
preponderance of the evidence.

See State v. Stevens, 311 Or.

119, 806 P.2d 92, 104 (1991) (in holding that, under Oregon
Constitution, state must prove voluntary consent to search

by

only a preponderance of the evidence, court adopts reasoning of
Lego v. Twomev).

Cf. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah

1989) ("State bears burden of proving by at least a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary").
-14-

In short, if this case is remanded, the Court should
direct the trial court that the state need only prove voluntary
consent by a preponderance of the evidence.
B. Exploitation
The exploitation prong of the Arrovo test is not so
easily understood or applied.

Without explaining precisely how

the exploitation analysis is to proceed, the Utah Supreme Court
said only that the primary inquiry is whether the consent was
sufficiently "attenuated" from the prior illegality such that the
consent was not "tainted" by that illegality.
91.

796 P.2d at 690-

The court noted the Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),

factors which should be considered, jld.. at 690-91 n.4, but did
not make clear whether the primary focus of the exploitation
analysis is the possible effect of the initial police misconduct
on the voluntariness of the consent or rather the police
misconduct itself.

Arrovo cites numerous cases on the issue of

exploitation, JLd. at 690-91, but does not express a preference
for one of the two approaches those cases appear to adopt.

Under

one approach, voluntariness of the consent is the primary
consideration, and if there is voluntary consent (i.e., the
consent has not been rendered involuntary by the prior police
illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is
generally admissible.

Under the other approach, the police

misconduct itself is the primary consideration.

A consent to

search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the

-15-

police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is "tainted," and
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible.
For example, some of the cases cited in Arroyo discuss
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the
consent.

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550

(11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v.
Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be
a product of her free will.").
On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent had been undermined by the
police misconduct.

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and whether it "taints" the consent such that
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
-16-

poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407f 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom,
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
The latter approach was followed by two panels of this
Court in Sims and Park, which, as already noted, involved consent
searches after illegal roadblock stops.

In Sims, the panel began

its analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not
challenge the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but
that he claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his
detention and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the
illegality of the detention."

808 P.2d at 150.

It applied the

Brown v. Illinois factors which Arroyo had identified as
pertinent to the evaluation of the "non-exploitation or
attenuation element":

"the temporal proximity of the primary

illegality and the granting of the consent, the presence or
absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct."

Ibid.

Concluding that

"the record demonstrates [the defendant's] consent to search his
vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of the illegal roadblock,"
id. at 152, the panel relied most heavily on two factors:

(1)

"the consent was obtained within minutes of the illegal stop, and
not even under our clear error standard of review could the trial
court find enough time between the stop and the grant of consent
to attenuate the relationship between the two;" and (2) "the
record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of intervening circumstances
-17-

between the illegal stop and [the defendant's] grant of consent
to the search," id. at 151.6 An identical approach was followed
by the Park panel in reversing the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress.

810 P.2d at 458-59.

This

mechanical application of the exploitation prong, which
automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wong Sun v. United

6

Although the Sims panel also considered the "purpose and
flagrancy" factor, 808 P.2d at 151-52, it is not clear whether it
concluded that the officers' misconduct was purposeful or
flagrant. However, the panel seemed to suggest that the
officers' conduct was flagrant because (1) "[t]he troopers each
had years of law enforcement experience, and [could] properly be
charged with awareness that their action was not authorized by
law," and (2) "[u]sing ten to twelve law officers to staff the
roadblock may have also left distant parts of the largely rural
jurisdiction with delayed police assistance in the event of
need." 808 P.2d at 151. First, at the time of the roadblock
there was no decision from either of Utah's appellate courts or
the federal courts that would have made it clear to the officers
that their actions were unconstitutional. And, to require of the
officers the clairvoyance necessary to anticipate Michigan Dept.
of State Police v. Sitz and the unique state constitutional
holding of Sims is unreasonable. Second, the panel's criticism
of the use of law enforcement resources, beyond being speculative
and outside of any particular expertise of the judiciary, does
not form a basis for concluding that the officers were guilty of
a flagrant or purposeful constitutional
violation.
Furthermore, Sims's suggestion that the absence of
purposeful or flagrant police misconduct can serve to "correct
the constitutional violation," 808 P.2d at 152, is wrong. All
that Arroyo recognizes is that voluntary consent to search, which
is not obtained by exploitation of an initial illegality, can be
the basis for the admission of evidence seized pursuant to such
consent; it does not stand for the proposition that such consent
"corrects" the prior constitutional violation.
-18-

States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

See United States v.

Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant
intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation").

As

stated in Arroyo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police.'"

796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong

Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted).
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they
fail to acknowledge that the Arroyo court chose to remand to the
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a
search of the vehicle),

796 P.2d at 692. Had the supreme court

considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as
Sims and Park concluded, it would not have remanded for a
determination of that question by the trial court.

In ordering a

remand, Arroyo implicitly rejected the mechanical approach to the
exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park.
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry,
which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be
most consistent with Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983),
identified in Arroyo as an example of the application of the
-19-

exploitation prong in a consent search case.

796 P.2d at 690.

In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a
search of his luggage, in which narcotics were found.7

Royer

moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage.

The

trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the
search was "freely and voluntarily" given.

460 U.S. at 495. The

intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention
tainted Royer's consent to search.

Ibid.

That decision was

affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion.

460 U.S.

at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690, the
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it

7

The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows:
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a
small room and retrieved his luggage from the
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally
responding to this request, Royer produced a
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which
one detective then opened without seeking
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was
found in that suitcase. According to
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did
not know the combination to the lock on the
second suitcase. When asked if he objected
to the detective opening the second suitcase,
Royer said "[n]o, go ahead," and did not
object when the detective explained that the
suitcase might have to be broken open. The
suitcase was pried open by the officers and
more marihuana was found. . . .

460 U.S. at 494-95.
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nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the
consent.

This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in

which he wrote:

"I agree with the plurality that . . • [the

defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot
be viewed as consensual."

460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J.,

concurring).
In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an
exploitation analysis that focuses solely

on voluntariness,

declining to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Carson, 793
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).

There,

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to
illegal police actions, the "exploitation"
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by
determining whether or not defendant's grant
of consent was voluntary under the
circumstances. . . • When defendant's grant
of consent is voluntary, then there is no
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary
consent and "exploitation" are mutually
exclusive.
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original).

However, the court's

rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its
reliance on Rover.

In this light, Arroyo is most reasonably read

as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search.

Under

such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily
and logically applied.
-21-

In Brown, the United States Supreme Court had before it
the narrow question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error
in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong
Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest."
605.

422 U.S. at

Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without

a warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder.
Id. at 591, 594-95. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that,
although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion.'

(Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'"

Id. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 307 N.E.2d
356, 358 (111. 1974)).

At bottom, the state court held that "the

Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain so
that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing
effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long as,
in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."

Ibid.

The

Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the implication of
its holding in Wong Sun to the facts of Brown's case.

Ibid.

The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun,
where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded."
-22-

Id. at 597. The statements were obtained from two defendants,
Toy and Wong Sun.

Toy's statement was obtained immediately after

he was pursued and arrested by six agents.

It apparently was a

spontaneous response to a question asked him in the frenzy of
that event, and the agents apparently made no attempt to advise
him of his right to remain silent. Wong Sun's statement, on the
other hand, was not given until after he was arraigned and
released on his own recognizance.

He voluntarily returned to the

station a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his
statement came after he had been advised of his right to remain
silent and to have counsel present. .Id., at 607-08 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part).

Under these facts, the Wong Sun Court ruled

that Toy's statement should not have been admitted as evidence
against him, holding that "the statement did not result from 'an
intervening independent act of a free will,' and that it was not
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion.'"

Id., at 598 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.

at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"

Ibid, (quoting Wong Sunf

371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted).
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he
exclusionary rule . • . was applied in Wong Sun primarily
protect Fourth Amendment rights.

to

Protection of the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's
-23-

paramount concern there," Jd. at 599 (emphasis in original).

In

short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police —

and thus

the different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's
statement.

As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring

opinion, "the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
sharply in focus." .Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part)
(citation omitted).
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court
rejected the per

se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois

courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per
for" rule of exclusion.

se or "but

Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he

question whether a confession is the product of a free will under
Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no
single fact is dispositive."

.Id. at 603.

It made clear that the

presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment
violation is admissible.

While that factor is important in

determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be
considered, including:

"[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest

and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances,
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct."

Jd.. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted).
-24-

11: :i s wi th 1:1 :i s understanding of Wong Sun and Brown
t h a t A r r o y o m u s t t e i: ead

hs j: • i:e 7 1 o u s J y dIscus sed, Arr oyo

s p e c i f i c a l l y relied o n Rover as an example of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
the expJ oi tation analysis t o a case w h e r e evidence w a s sei zed
pu r s u a 111 t o a c on s en t t o sear c 1 1 wh i c h f o 1 1 owe d a 1 1 i n i. t i a 1 f o u r t h
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T h e Rover plurality's primary concern
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consent, (2) app] i es the Brown factors to determine whether the

11: i n e s s : • f 1:1 1 = :::: : 1 1 s e 1 1 !:: v a s i 1: 1 f a • : t: a f f e c 1: e d 1: ;; t: 1 1 e j: 1: i o
police i l l e g a l ! ty, ai id (3) considers whether tl le p o l i c e
mi sconduct wa « F n f f i r j ent ly flagrant o r pi irposef 11] that: t h e
1

1 rlt- in 1 '-In HI I 11 U- i xn J1 id HI I e v ei 1 tl ion 1 :jl 1 1:1 ie c o i i s e i 1 t: t: :: s e a r ::1 1 ; a s

entirely voluntary.

The i n 31 1 :i 1: y would p r o c e e d a s f o l l o w s :

Was t h e c o n s e n t :i n f a c t

(111 )

r e n d e r e d i n v o l u n t a ry by the t e m p o r a l

pioxiiiiii t y b e t w e e n tl ie f DUI: tl 1 amendment vie l a t i on ai id tl ie c ::>j is en t ,

the absence of a n y intervening c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o r flagrant p o l i c e
misconduct?8

{ 2 ) Even :i f i t is determined that t h e consent w a s

v o l u n t a r y a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n ::: f the possi t l e effect of a J 11 three

8

Consideration, of v o l u n t a r i n e s s under the exploitatioi 1
p r o n g of the A r r o y o test m a y overlap t o some d e g r e e w i t h t h e
v o l u n t a r i n e s s i n q u i r y w h i c h h a s already occurred u n d e r t h e first
prong of that t e s t . H o w e v e r , under t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n prong,
p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n is paid t o t h e p o l i c e i l l e g a l i t y a n d its
possible effect on voluntariness.
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Brown factors on voluntariness, was the police misconduct
purposeful or flagrant such that the evidence should be excluded
in order to deter that level of police misconduct?

With respect

to this second question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant
violation of the fourth amendment, then the first two Brown
factors (temporal proximity and intervening circumstances) are
considered to determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to
remove the "taint" from the flagrant violation which would
naturally flow under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell illustrated
this process in the confession context:
I would require the clearest indication of
attenuation in cases in which official
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth
Amendment r i g h t s . . . . In such cases the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is
most likely to be effective, and the
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial
integrity most clearly demands that the
fruits of the official misconduct be denied.
I thus would require some demonstrably
effective break in the chain of events
leading from the illegal arrest to the
statement, such as actual consultation with
counsel or the accused's presentation before
a magistrate for a determination of probable
cause, before the taint can be deemed
removed.
422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted).

A similar analysis would

be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficiently

-26-

a 1:tenuatedli j i i terms o£ 1:i n:te and circumstance to D e iree oi u i«
taint of the flagrant police misconduct, 9
This approach recognizes both that "i n some circumstances
strict adherence to the Fou rtl :i Amendment excj usionary rule

":

imposes greater cost oi i legitimate demands of law enforcement
than can be justified by the rule's deterrent purposes," and that
:i i i :ases c f f ] a ::jra i if j o] i ce in :i s :::: :: a I :ii ILC: it: " t l ic deterrei it 1 a ] i le of
the exclusioi tary rule is most 1 ikely to be effective, """ Brown, .
422 U.S. at 608-09 , 6 ] 1 (Powel] , ]
Thus

concurring in part).

as sum :i i ig a rer ia.1 id c f tl :i i s :::ase f : r • :: •• : i isil der ati on

~f the exploitation prong of the Arroyo test, this Cour t should
1: re-:" the tri al court to employ the foregoing analysis, rather

previously discussed, is not consistent wi th either Rover or the
remand ordered in Arroyo.

9

Had the officers' conduct in Sims actually been
=~rant,
which it was not, the panel would have been correct in .,
^Ing
the evidence on,, the basis that there was no significant 1
of
time or intervening circumstances between the consent h
and the illegality. But in the absence of flagrant COJ. . .
he
approach followed in Sims was incorrect for the reasons already
discussed.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
remand this case to the trial court for a determination of
whether defendant's consent to search was valid under Arroyo.
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During the roadblock, all cars were stopped.
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped.
officer

Pursuant

During the stop, the

present observed defendant Small shove a plastic bag

between the front seats of the car.

The officer checked both

defendants1 identification and determined that the car was not
registered to either defendant.
dispatch

While awaiting confirmation from

regarding registration,

the officer

asked

defendants

whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car.
The response was in the negative.
permission to search the vehicle.

The officer then requested

Consent was given.

As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer
noticed a gun under the front seat.
passenger
quantity

compartment
of

firearms.

drugs,
In

the

of

the

drug
course

Subsequent search of the

vehicle

revealed

paraphernalia,
of

the

a

money,

search

of

substantial
and

the

loaded

passenger

compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything
about the firearms or the drugs.
negative.

Defendants responded in the

They were subsequently arrested

and were apprised of

their rights before any further attempt at questioning.
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana.
subsequently,

opened

the

trunk

and

found

more

drugs

He
and

paraphernalia.
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).

The checkpoint was located in
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"ienth
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fur the m
i

Cai nei

car

I he
if
t

^ facts; came to

light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (Carner).
The uncontroverted testimony is that the defendants were properly
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning.
All of the above factors: notice of the stop,
location,

legitimate

purpose

of

the

stop,

training

of

its
the

officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion,

establish a minimum

of public inconvenience.
Defendants

gave

permission

Consent was never withdrawn.

to

search

the

vehicle.

As such, the subsequent search of

the trunk was reasonable and proper.

Even if the consent was

somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had
probable cause to search the trunk space.

See State v. Earl, 716

P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the
vehicle

stop,

administered.

search,

and

subsequent

arrest

were

properly

The Court therefore denies defendants1 motion to

suppress.
DATED at Provo, Utah this ^ f

n

day of August, 1989.

GEORGE ¥. BALLIF, JUDGE
cc: Dexter Anderson
Milton Harmon
Sumner Hatch
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